

a refusal which finds itself marked by a variety of grammatical and discursive functions, notably an increased presence of 'shifters': 'Your social sciences', 'What you call liberty', and the deliberate negation in the main clause of an existence that is asserted in the preconstructed of the subordinate clause: 'He who died on the cross to redeem the world never existed'. This position, which could be politically qualified as that of revolt, is essentially defensive but can open onto a third possibility: *disidentification*. It is this concept which is the most vital and least developed part of Pêcheux's work. In it he attempts to describe those practices which displace the agent from that position of subjective centrality which is the result of both identification and counter-identification. These practices are defined as those of science and proletarian politics. Pêcheux's difficulty is that he, quite rightly, finds it impossible to accept a classic science/ideology or proletarian politics/bourgeois politics distinction in which universal and formal features define the divisions. On the other hand Pêcheux remains committed to a *general* description of ideology and bourgeois politics with the result that ideology and bourgeois politics become the eternal hell to which we are subjected and their alternatives are only momentary displacements into a better world. Ideological subjection thus becomes a feature in language while science and proletarian politics are transformed into ephemeral agents of grace which fleetingly rescue us from the sin of the subject position into which we inevitably relapse. The strengths and weaknesses of Pêcheux's position resemble Althusser's. The weakness is the identification of subject and ego, a formulation of the grounds of political and ideological struggle such that defeat is inevitable, the strength is the posing of the problems of identification as politically and ideologically crucial. To rectify the schema offered by Pêcheux it is necessary to stress the incoherence of the interdiscourse, an incoherence grounded in the contradictory positioning and representations of the body. It is in terms of these contradictions that one can provide a material base for an account of the elaboration of specific sciences (there is no need of a general theory of science, simply the specification of the particular developments, which displace and break with the experiential-perceptual centrality of the body). Politically the effect of the emphasis on the body is to stress the importance of a politics of sexuality as the crucial moments in the subversion of the policeman's demand for identification.

- 14) What is in question here is perhaps the most important of the disidentificatory practices of language which Pêcheux fails to mention: those practices of writing which are generally named as 'literature'. If much literature is devoted to a re-articulation of crucial social identifications, there are certain practices of writing which break definitively with the very possibility of identification. 'Literature' may be limited to certain elites in our class society but its disidentificatory practices on language find wider social currency in certain forms of jokes.

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INTERDISCOURS, SYSTEME DU SYMBOLISME COLLECTIF, LITTERATURE Thèses à propos d'une théorie Générative du discours et de la littérature

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J'ai l'intention de parler dans les thèses suivantes entre autres du « symbolisme collectif », y compris de « symboles collectifs », au singulier. Je suis bien conscient du fait que le terme de « symbole » se prête à la confusion terminologique la plus chaotique qu'on puisse imaginer. Ne me demandez donc pas pourquoi je me suis lancé dans ce chaos — je ne saurais vous répondre autre chose que c'est fait, c'est parti ... Disons pour commencer que par « symbole », j'aimerais comprendre des *images signifiantes*, par conséquence plus que de simples *signes*. L'illustration historique la plus suggestive serait l'*emblème* dans le sens baroque, p. ex. l'image de l'arbre avec la signification de « constantia ». Par « symbole collectif », je comprends donc une image signifiante dont l'aspect collectif provient de sa surdétermination socio-historique, p. ex. techno-historique. Je proposerai une condition de plus, à savoir qu'un symbole collectif dans mon

sens puisse être employé à la fois comme métaphore, comme synecdoque représentative (*pars pro toto*) et comme symbole pragmatique. Tout cela vous semblera compliqué, peut-être, mais j'espère bien que j'arriverai à m'expliquer en analysant des exemples concrets. C'est pourquoi j'aimerais commencer par un exemple concret à savoir un contexte littéraire qui fait usage du symbole collectif du *ballon* et qui j'espère s'avérera suffisamment familier dans une culture francophone pour que je puisse continuer d'en faire mon exemple-clé.

Dans son roman « Les Epigones », publié en 1836, l'auteur Karl Immermann met en scène deux amis qui demeurent dans une petite ville et qui cherchent à chasser leur ennui en débattant et en se disputant. Il s'agit plus exactement du débat appelé plus tard par Charles Percy Snow « des deux cultures », à savoir d'une culture herméneutique des humanités et d'une culture basée sur les sciences exactes. Car l'un des deux amis se trouve être professeur de lycée et philologue tandis que l'autre enseigne dans un lycée technique la chimie — d'où leur débat sur les avantages ou les désavantages de leurs systèmes d'enseignement réciproques. Au cours d'un de leurs entretiens, le philologue s'adresse à son adversaire de la façon suivante : « Trouvez-moi autre chose qui serait capable de gonfler l'âme autant que les seuls noms de Rome et d'Athènes ! Très à propos un grand poète et philosophe a dit que nous nous sentons comme flottant dans l'air à bord d'un ballon-montgolfier du moment même où nous ouvrons notre Homère ». Voilà donc le symbole collectif du ballon employé comme métaphore pour la puissance de fascination qu'exercerait la poésie classique. L'adversaire se défend pourtant de son mieux contre cet 'argument' : « Hélas ! hélas ! Flotter dans l'air, nous ne l'avons fait que trop depuis des siècles ; et il ne serait nullement difficile de vous prouver que jusqu'aux difficultés mêmes de ces jeunes gens (à savoir des étudiants radicaux dont traite le roman, J.L.) il ne s'agit d'autre chose que des faux pas que ne manquerait pas de faire celui qui venant des nuages poserait son pied d'abord sur un sol et terrain solide ».

J'aimerais signaler d'abord, pour commenter le passage cité, qu'il s'agit entre autres d'un renvoi '*intertextuel*' (dans le sens de Michail Bachtin, de Julia Kristeva et de Renate Lachmann), car le « grand poète et philosophe » dont il s'agit n'est personne d'autre que Goethe lui-même qui avait écrit dans une lettre à Schiller (datée du 12 mai

1798) : « Comme vous l'avez souhaité, je viens de recevoir votre lettre au moment même où j'étais plongé dans l'Iliade où j'aime à retourner avec toujours plus de plaisir — n'est-ce pas qu'on se dirait emporté ainsi que par un ballon-montgolfier par-delà tout ce qui est terrestre pour arriver réellement dans cet intervalle céleste où marchaient les dieux ? » L'analyse de l'intertextualité serait alors capable de signaler une intégration herméneutique multiple effectuant une sorte de 'charge' sémantique, à savoir d'une part la série : mythe grec — Homère — Goethe — Immermann, et d'autre part la série : dieux olympiques — ballon = puissance de fascination exercée par la poésie. Par contre, j'aimerais signaler pour ma part qu'il ne suffit pas d'analyser les interférences entre des textes déjà institutionnalisés dans la tradition littéraire, mais qu'il importe peut-être encore plus de tenir compte de l'interférence de discours anonymes moyennant le symbole collectif du ballon. J'aimerais donc parler non pas le l'intertexte, mais de l'*interdiscours*.

Pourquoi nos deux protagonistes cherchent-ils au juste à défendre leurs « cultures » réciproques en se servant d'un symbole collectif plutôt que d'une argumentation à base de formules étymologiques et grammaticales ou bien chimiques ? La réponse paraît banale : évidemment parce que le partenaire du débat serait incapable de suivre une telle argumentation spécialisée. Je proposerais donc de partir du fait fondamental de la *division sociale du travail* pour analyser la fonction aussi bien de l'interdiscours que du symbolisme collectif et de la littérature. Comme l'a constaté jadis Staline vis-à-vis de Marx (il n'était pas le seul à le constater bien sûr), la division d'une société en classes ne se reflète pas simplement dans une division linguistique. Il n'y a pas de langue prolétaire ou bourgeoise (dans le sens d'une grammaire), et Lénine aurait parfaitement été capable de s'entretenir dans une même langue russe avec le tzar. Il faudrait plutôt aller plus loin : Il n'y a même pas un *discours* prolétarien ou bourgeois, il n'y a pas de 'jeux de langue' au sens wittgensteinien qui seraient spécifiques à une classe. La différenciation des discours ne part pas à mon avis des classes, mais de la division du travail ce qui n'est pas la même chose. Nous suivrons donc Michel Foucault en parlant d'un discours juridique, d'un discours médical, d'un discours d'économie politique etc., et nous appellerons discours chaque région d'un savoir spécialisé qui correspond à une pratique institutionnalisée

sur la base de la division sociale du travail et au moyen d'un ensemble de 'rituels' pragmatiques propres. Il va sans dire que la tendance vers une spécialisation toujours plus grande des discours équivalait à un défi majeur pour la capacité de communication quotidienne d'une société — de quelle manière sera-t-il encore possible que puisse communiquer l'ouvrier avec le médecin, la femme de ménage avec le professeur de mathématiques ?

La communication reste pourtant possible par le fait qu'il y a, au-delà des discours spéciaux, les '*jeux de langage*' interdiscursifs à fonction réintégrative. J'hésite devant une formule comme serait 'un interdiscours' ou '*plusieurs interdiscours*', et cela pour la raison suivante : Nous avons affaire d'abord à un « fourmillement » voire « pululement » comme aurait dit Foucault d'interférences et de points de contact entre les discours dans le cadre de ce qu'on nomme normalement la « vie quotidienne ». Ce terrain interdiscursif est constitué par une forte sélectivité envers les discours spéciaux ; matériellement, il est constitué par un nombre élevé de « coups » au sens de la théorie des jeux, à savoir de figures, de clichés, de stéréotypes, d'images et de manières de représentation, de rituels pragmatiques etc. J'ai proposé de ramasser un sous-ensemble de tels éléments interdiscursifs sous la catégorie des « *formes de littérature élémentaire* » : Le temps me manque pour traiter l'ensemble de ces formes dans le cadre de l'exposé que voici ; je me bornerai donc à parler des *symboles collectifs*. Pourquoi le ballon, p. ex., devint-il, depuis son invention en 1783, un des symboles collectifs dominants des cultures bourgeoises occidentales ?

Voici une brève esquisse des raisons : D'une part, le ballon était censé représenter la série des '*machines*' (on parla de la 'machine aérostatique' durant la première phase après 1783), c'est-à-dire des applications du bloc discursif des sciences exactes. D'autre part, il fit partie des grands spectacles de masses proches du cirque, et même des '*miracles*' réservés jadis au discours religieux. L'incroyable véhicule perça donc, à la manière d'une véritable 'explosion', la limite discursive entre 'savoir' et 'croyance', et c'était exactement cette qualité du symbole que devaient problématiser plus tard bon nombre des mythes littéraires du ballon. Enfin, le ballon devint un symbole saillant du 'progrès', et cela à cause de la possibilité qu'eurent de grands rassemblements humains d'assister à son ascension. En exa-

gérant un peu, je pourrais dire que les ascensions des ballons devinrent une sorte de 'messes papales de la religion du progrès' ayant leur propre et combien plus évidente 'élévation'. S'y ajouta un événement discursif imprévisible de majeure importance : je veux dire bien sûr la révolution française. La proximité métonymique (locale ainsi que temporelle) entre ballon et révolution fit du premier le symbole de la dernière. Écoutons, à titre exemplaire, le jacobin rhénan Joseph Görres (qui devint un adversaire de la révolution après brumaire seulement) : « Ainsi, la révolution avait-elle touché à son terme. Pareille à un aérostat elle s'était élancée jusque vers les régions sublimes des météores de feu, par delà tout ce qui est quotidien et terrestre, par delà les tempêtes et les orages, bien loin de la nature humaine quotidienne. Mais le milieu était par trop délié, par trop éthérien pour l'enveloppe grossière ainsi que pour la force du gaz ; l'enveloppe éclata en morceaux, le gaz s'échappa et voilà que le palais aérien descendit vers la terre (...) ».

Cette citation constitue pour elle-même une sorte d'événement discursif 'moléculaire' puisqu'elle marque précisément le renversement entre deux *positions discursives* opposées. Par position discursive, j'entends l'emploi évaluatif (c'est-à-dire positif ou négatif) d'un symbole collectif ou plus exactement d'une série tout entière de tels symboles. Si l'intelligentsia attachée radicalement aux Lumières et à la Révolution lut de façon positive l'ascension du ballon vers les sublimes risquées et si elle lut de façon négative le sol plat et banal de la terre, l'évaluation parmi les adversaires des Lumières (au moins de la tendance radicale des Lumières) et de la révolution était tout contraire et l'on prit l'ascension du ballon pour une entreprise peu sérieuse voire même blasphématoire.

Comme je viens déjà de suggérer, l'on ne peut à mon avis parler d'une position discursive au sens strict qu'au cas où il s'agit de séries entières, de chaînes entières et de réseaux entiers de symboles collectifs. Je vais donc parler maintenant du problème théorique d'un *système synchronique des symboles collectifs*. Je suis convaincu du fait qu'aucun symbole et qu'aucune métaphore sera suffisamment analysée au cas où elle est traitée dans son contexte uniquement fût-ce le contexte constitué par l'ensemble des œuvres d'un auteur. Pour prendre l'exemple du *ballon*, on ne peut traiter ce symbole en le détachant de la topique d'un *mouvement* (soit horizontal ou vertical), d'un

haut et d'un *bas*, du *ciel* et du *sol plat et solide*. Plus que cela : Le ballon est un élément de la série symbolique de toutes les *machines* (constituée au temps de son invention surtout par les *horloges* et les machines mécaniques apparentées aux horloges). Il est aussi un élément de la série symbolique de tous les *véhicules* où il était placé au temps de son invention en connexion étroite avec le *bateau* et en opposition symbolique avec les *diligences*. Ce n'est pas tout : Comme il est suggéré par bon nombre de références prises dans des textes publicistes d'environ 1800, des séries autrement étendues de symboles furent établies au cours des Lumières et de la Révolution : Ainsi, l'ascension du ballon fonctionna comme symboliquement équivalent au *lever du soleil* (pensez aux images et aux textes rassemblés par Jean Starobinski), à *l'éruption d'un volcan*, à *l'orage* et aux *flots* de l'océan ou des grandes rivières. Je ne peux, pour la raison évidente que mon temps disponible est restreint, décrire ici en détail les règles et les lois constituant le système synchronique des symboles collectifs. J'ai effleuré au début la loi fondamentale du jeu de la combinatoire et de l'intégration des discours spécialisés dans le cadre de l'inter-discours. J'aimerais souligner pourtant qu'il ne s'agit nullement de mécanismes purement sémantiques, mais toujours et même de façon prépondérante de mécanismes pragmatiques voire historiques. Pour citer un exemple, il semble évident qu'une série symbolique entre ballon, volcan, orage et flots n'aurait certes pas été constituée sans le fait que tous ces symboles étaient applicables à des masses humaines emportées par l'enthousiasme, p. ex. révolutionnaire.

Nous avons ainsi dans les années 1790 d'une part la position discursive des radicaux illuminés et révolutionnaires qui ose évaluer de façon positive la force du *volcan* (qui d'ailleurs servit d'emblème à la « Montagne ») ainsi que de l'orage et des flots. (Dans la littérature allemande, cette position est représentée de façon exemplaire par Hölderlin). C'est cette position discursive même qui donne une évaluation positive de l'ascension du ballon également. Nous avons d'autre part la position opposée qui nous met en garde contre les risques du ballon, du volcan et des flots océaniques et qui nous recommande en même temps le sol solide et les digues (ce fut cette position qu'adopta plus tard Metternich). Or il serait très peu probable de croire que le jeu fourmillant et polémique de l'interdiscours pourrait laisser intacts les *fronts* discursifs à la longue : tout au contraire, les

conversations, le journalisme, le discours politique et la littérature au sens le plus large y sèment continuellement le chaos et mettent tout sens dessus-dessous. Était-ce un hasard ou non si parmi les inventions majeures du temps de la révolution il faut noter celle de la *guerrilla*, du combat des partisans, qui fut inventée au pays de Goya, l'un des joueurs les plus virtuoses avec les éléments du système du symbolisme collectif dont je viens d'esquisser les contours. Et voilà que ce système lui-même s'avère le champs de bataille d'une *guerrilla* discursive ainsi qu'interdiscursive en permanence où un '*front*' ne pourra jamais s'établir que temporairement et partiellement, et où, si front il y a, il pourra se renverser d'un moment à l'autre. Ce fut le cas vers 1800 quand luisait la lumière incertaine de l'étoile napoléonienne. En suivant Napoléon, la bourgeoisie dégrisée qui venait de désertier le camp des masses plébéiennes enthousiasmées, joignit la position discursive de ses adversaires contrerévolutionnaires ; ainsi fut établie la *position discursive 'réaliste'*, tellement caractéristique de tout le XIX^e siècle bourgeois. Le *chemin de fer*, ce véhicule se mouvant sur voie solide, collant au sol, économique, n'était pas encore inventé quand déjà le ballon tomba victime de ce renversement. Je vous cite ce qu'écrivit un journaliste libéral et bourgeois de la Rhénanie-Westphalie en 1819 : « Philosophie, voilà un ballon pour un voyage par delà les étoiles afin de trouver de la sagesse à un endroit où l'on ne voit rien, où l'on est étranger et d'où par conséquent l'on ne ramènera que déraison et absurdités ». L'auteur anonyme voulait certainement s'en prendre à la philosophie spéculative de l'idéalisme allemand et surtout du romantisme. Et en effet, pour compléter le paradoxe, le romantisme s'identifia à la position discursive des Lumières et de la Révolution bien qu'il ait penché, après Brumaire, plutôt vers des choix politiques conservateurs. Nous avons donc affaire à un *chiasme discursif* (échange des positions) complet. Je pourrais citer comme exemple typique de la position discursive romantique le poème « L'aéronaute », par Karoline von Günderrode — mais Goethe aussi (rappelez-vous comme exemple le début de ma conférence) emploie le symbole du ballon toujours suivant une position romantique (bien qu'il prît envers les autres symboles de la révolution comme le volcan etc. une position disons 'ambivalente').

Avant de suivre plus loin les conséquences de mon orientation théorique pour l'histoire de la littérature dont les contours pourtant sont peut-être déjà devenues visibles, je suis obligé de faire un pas en arrière pour reparler brièvement de l'*interdiscours* : J'avais présenté le système du symbolisme collectif comme faisant partie de l'interdiscours (plus particulièrement comme faisant partie de son secteur 'littéraire-élémentaire'). Il faut que j'y revienne. Les symboles collectifs ainsi que les séries symboliques comme p. ex. les 'machines' représentent voire connotent souvent un discours spécial donné, à savoir celui de leur provenance, dans le cas des machines celui des sciences naturelles et de leur application technique, de même celui du savoir médical pour les symboles pathologiques etc.. On pourrait donc se figurer le système des symboles à la manière d'un 'marché' où les discours spéciaux peuvent échanger certains de leur stéréotypes exemplaires. Ainsi il y a réintégration — à un niveau hautement sélectif et imaginaire il est vrai — non seulement entre les « deux cultures » analysées par Snow, mais virtuellement entre l'ensemble des discours d'une culture. N'allez donc pas être surpris si moi-même aussi au cours de cette conférence, je me sers à plusieurs reprises de métaphores et de symboles pour me faire comprendre ; je suis sujet au même mécanisme qui p. ex. transforme régulièrement les préfaces et les introductions aux manuels d'un discours spécial donné en des lieux où véritablement les symboles collectifs pullulent. De telles préfaces sont caractéristiques du *cadre interdiscursif* dans lequel n'importe quel texte appartenant à un discours spécial doit obligatoirement entrer s'il ne veut pas perdre toute acceptabilité culturelle. Or, il y a plusieurs genres ou sortes de texte dominés par la fonction interdiscursive, comme p. ex. les genres '*populaires*' ainsi que les genres journalistiques et littéraires au sens le plus large du terme. Avant de revenir dans un instant à la littérature, j'aimerais d'abord présenter la *conversation* comme le prototype d'un jeu de langage interdiscursif. Souvenons-nous de la dispute entre les deux protagonistes du roman d'Immermann commentée au début de ma conférence, il s'agissait bien d'un bout de conversation. Deux discours spécialisés avaient l'intention de se disputer — pour pouvoir le faire, ils devaient tous les deux entrer dans l'interdiscours. Voici un exemple supplémentaire, choisi dans un soi-disant 'roman de conversation' de Theodor Fontane (« Der Stechlin ») : « Seul le va-banque peut intéres-

ser, les torpilleurs p. ex. ou les tunnels sous l'océan ou bien les ballons. J'imagine déjà que nous allons voir bientôt des batailles aériennes ». Voilà un brin de conversation entre une comtesse et un officier prussien déjà régi par Eros. Les deux conversent de ballons — la comtesse, comme nous venons de le voir, d'aventures militaires à bord de ballons, tandis que l'officier, lui, parle de son pasteur protestant qu'il admire et qui certainement serait tout autre qu'un pyrotechnicien — « Mais j'ose vous le présenter comme un aéronaute, cela sans doute. C'est bien un homme-excelsior, un homme d'ascension, appartenant à cette sphère supérieure réelle d'où tire son origine tout ce qui est sublime, l'Espérance voire même l'Amour ». Comme je l'ai déjà fait entendre, l'amour en question va se convertir de Caritas en Amour, et au pasteur incombera le service du mariage. Avez-vous remarqué pourtant comment fonctionne le jeu interdiscursif de la conversation ? Par le moyen du ballon en tant que symbole collectif, l'interdiscours opère une intégration multiple : à savoir entre deux régions discursives (la militaire et la religieuse), et cela par un échange en forme de chiasme (c'est la femme qui parle militaire et c'est l'homme qui parle église). Intégration aussi entre deux groupes sociaux (il s'agit de deux couches différentes de la noblesse, l'une prussienne et l'autre étrangère à la Prusse) ; intégration enfin entre les deux sexes par un chiasme des rôles discursifs attendus. Pour converger amoureusement, les discours spécialisés doivent d'abord apprendre à jouer à quatre mains du piano des signifiants symboliques et du matériel interdiscursif. Dans la conversation comme genre de littérature élémentaire, les germes d'un roman se trouvent déjà impliqués.

J'aimerais effleurer maintenant très brièvement le problème que pose la relation entre l'interdiscours et l'histoire sociale. Comme je l'ai déjà souligné, la division de la société en classes ne se reflète pas de façon isomorphe dans une division analogue des discours. Il faut partir plutôt de la structure de la division du travail qui orienterait de façon directe la structure des discours et en même temps de façon indirecte aussi la structure des classes. Certes le bloc discursif des sciences exactes y compris la technologie de leur application ainsi que le bloc discursif de l'industrialisme sont-ils en relation très étroite avec l'essor du capitalisme, seulement il faut voir que les deux classes antagonistes du capital, à savoir la bourgeoisie et

le prolétariat, devaient s'orienter toutes les deux *également*, sur le plan culturel, vers le bloc discursif de l'industrialisme y compris ses séries symboliques. Par sa position doublement hégémonique, à savoir dans l'histoire sociale comme dans l'histoire des discours, l'industrialisme devait occuper la position dominante aussi bien dans l'ensemble de la société que dans l'ensemble de la culture. Typique pour cet état de choses la conversation chez Fontane entre deux aristocrates qui ne connaissent plus d'autre jeux de va-banque que les jeux avec les engins produits par l'industrialisme : « les torpilleurs ou les tunnels sous l'océan ou bien les ballons » (mentionnons en passant que le cercle poétique du jeune Fontane fut baptisé pathétiquement « Tunnel au-dessus de la Spree »). Si donc les blocs socio-historiques antagonistes doivent s'inscrire malgré eux dans un seul système de symboles, il ne leur reste d'abord d'autre possibilité pour trouver une formule culturelle à leur antagonisme que le seul jeu des positions discursives. Or nous avons vu que bourgeoisie et prolétariat s'inscrivent tous les deux dans les mêmes séries symboliques de l'industrialisme, qu'elles emploient tous les deux avec une évaluation positive de manière qu'ils ne sauraient plus du tout se mettre en opposition sinon en rétorquant le raisonnement de l'adversaire selon le modèle suivant : « Vous autres vous mettez les freins au Progrès ! ».

« Mais non au contraire, c'est vous-mêmes qui y mettez les freins ! » Il serait beaucoup plus efficace d'investir les séries symboliques de l'industrialisme de façon négative comme le fit le rousseauisme et comme le fait aujourd'hui le néo-rousseauisme, p. ex. le mouvement des « verts » en Allemagne Occidentale. Un tel investissement présuppose une série d'événements discursifs dont la structure serait trop complexe et trop compliquée à analyser ici. Disons pourtant que la formation d'un nouveau système synchronique de symbolisme collectif à partir d'un secteur innovatif d'un ancien constitue en tout cas la grande exception qui surviendra une fois en plusieurs siècles seulement et qui toujours ira ensemble avec une rupture culturelle d'envergure épocale.

Disons en guise de résumé que l'interdiscours, la littérature élémentaire et le système du symbolisme collectif qui en constitue un élément important permettent tous les trois un jeu polémique entre positions discursives antagonistes sur la base d'un code culturel

commun et sans lequel nous aurions affaire à de simples relations de reflet à partir des antagonismes sociohistoriques.

Les formations de 'fronts' discursifs toujours partiels et discontinus dépendent moins directement d'évolutions sociohistoriques au sens restreint, p. ex. d'évolutions économiques que d'évolutions dans la configuration discursive et d'événements discursifs souvent contingents. C'est pourquoi il y a toujours la place pour une position discursive paradoxale comme celle du rousseauisme voire du néo-rousseauisme, et c'est pourquoi il y a toujours la place pour un jeu individuel de combinatoire innovative et de montage créatif sur la base de plusieurs positions discursives données. S'il est vrai que telle formule spirituelle dans ce sens trouvée en conversation pourra être bien vite oubliée, elle pourra également constituer un événement discursif en devenant formule littéraire. Comme vous voyez, j'arrive enfin à la littérature au sens restreint, c'est-à-dire à la littérature poétique. La littérature dans ce sens restreint, je la considérerai donc, dans la perspective esquissée, comme une sorte d'*élaboration socialement institutionnalisée du matériel interdiscursif*. Nous aurions affaire par conséquent pour ainsi dire à une métamorphose paradoxale que subirait l'interdiscours pour être transformée en discours spécialisé à son tour. Je donnerai donc la formule générative fondamentale suivante pour la littérature poétique : élaboration et transformation de la littérature élémentaire mise à la disposition des auteurs par leur culture, entre autres du symbolisme collectif. J'espère avoir illustré cette formule déjà suffisamment par mes exemples concrets. Je pourrais dire aussi : Avant qu'une intertextualité ne puisse s'établir, l'interdiscursivité a dû toujours déjà exister.

Il n'y a guère d'auteur qui puisse mieux illustrer ma thèse que Jean-Paul Friedrich, qui, à l'exemple de Rousseau, prit pour nom d'auteur « Jean-Paul » tout court. Il fit son début en écrivant des discours publicistes dans le courant des Lumières et même de leur tendance plutôt radicale. Pour le faire, il établit une sorte de banque de données avant la lettre, à savoir de fiches sur le savoir technologique et sur celui des sciences naturelles de son temps. Ces matériaux lui servirent plus tard de 'lexique' (dans le sens que donne à ce mot la grammaire générative) pour le symbolisme et pour les métaphores de ses romans. L'emploi intensif et toujours positif du symbole du ballon chez Jean-Paul montre que sa position discursive était d'abord

proche de la position des Lumières et de la Révolution. Comme chez la plupart des intellectuels allemands, il y eut un changement partiel de sa position plus tard qui n'alla pourtant pas aussi loin que dans le cas de Görres. Je vous donne un exemple typique : « Je pense que notre époque, ce navire aérien et éthéré qui s'est élevé toujours plus haut en allumant de nouvelles lampes et en jettant par-dessus bord le vieux lest, devrait maintenant s'arrêter de le faire afin de plutôt ramasser et de conserver les vieilles choses ». Cet exemple peut bien servir d'illustration au mécanisme génératif du système symbolique des symboles : les « lumières » du XVIII^e devenant des « lampes », c'est-à-dire le feu qui fait monter le ballon. En se servant du concept rhétorique, l'on pourrait appeler *catachrèses* de symboles ce genre de combinaisons. Le discours littéraire de Jean Paul dont le style surchargé d'images se sert d'une série de digressions dans la tradition de Sterne, donne l'impression d'un « *méandre de catachrèses* » traversant tout le système des symboles collectifs en y opérant ainsi nombre de relations aussi bien syntagmatiques que paradigmatiques (il faudrait ajouter en plus que Jean Paul aime à ajouter de nouvelles métaphores inconnues au système du symbolisme collectif).

Ainsi, le symbole du ballon p. ex. est employé non seulement dans le sens de Lumières et de Révolution, non seulement dans le sens de Poésie, mais encore (dans des contextes érotiques) dans le sens d'enthousiasme amoureux (Jean Paul parlant alors du « cœur-ballon »). Le système du symbolisme collectif détermine donc toute la microstructure métaphorique des romans, et le symbole du ballon devient en plus un thème dominant de narrations entières. Je ne me réfère qu'aux deux exemples les mieux connus : A la fin du roman « Das Kampanertal » qui traite du problème de l'immortalité de l'âme, c'est l'ascension d'un ballon qui sert de symbole pathétique pour l'Espérance métaphysique. Je peux peut-être me servir de cet exemple pour préciser ce que j'entends par le procès d'élaboration et de transformation du symbolisme collectif dont je viens de parler. Ainsi que je viens déjà de l'expliquer, la position dominante du ballon dans le système des symboles était dûe, au moment de la Révolution, à l'effet d'articulation qu'il opéra entre les discours scientifique et religieux (en représentant un « miracle scientifique »). Jean Paul se saisit de ce matériel tout en transformant l'antagonisme implicite entre le savoir et la foi en identité symbolique. Sa position discursive se trouve être

pourtant encore beaucoup plus complexe et beaucoup plus ambivalente. L'histoire de l'aéronaute Giannozzo peint le pilote solitaire d'un ballon qui — mi-jacobin et mi-poète — ne croit point à l'existence d'un au-delà à la manière de son auteur Jean Paul. Le voyage en ballon de Giannozzo, plein de contingences et d'aventures, se transforme ainsi en un symbole d'une ironie radicale des Lumières ainsi que d'une intervention politique révolutionnaire.

La fin du voyage intervient au-dessus des sommets des Alpes, en Suisse ; elle se déroule en catastrophe spectaculaire : C'est que le ballon explose, comme un météore parmi les éclairs, les volcans et les soleils, au milieu de l'orage qui lui est symboliquement équivalent comme nous venons de voir. Le scénario de cette catastrophe se trouve en plus être symboliquement équivalent à ce cosmos radicalement décentré et sans Dieu imaginé par Jean Paul à la fois comme un chaos chancelant et comme une danse voluptueuse. Je me réfère ici au « Discours du Christ mort du haut de l'Univers expliquant que nul Dieu n'existe ». Il faut donc conclure que Jean Paul, mis devant le choix entre les deux positions discursives romantique et réaliste dont je viens de parler, décida de refuser un choix si simple bien que sans aucun doute il se soit senti plus proche de la romantique ; il semble plutôt manœuvrer, à la manière d'un saltimbanque sur sa corde, le long de la ligne même de démarcation entre les deux positions discursives. Si l'on voulait s'avancer encore plus, on pourrait même avancer la thèse selon laquelle le style narratif particulier de Jean Paul, digressif et en zig-zag comme je l'ai indiqué, aurait élaboré et transformé en symbole le geste fondamental du voyage en ballon.

J'avais l'intention de corroborer, en vous citant l'exemple de Jean Paul dont le « Giannozzo » est sans doute de qualité littéraire majeure, ma thèse fondamentale selon laquelle la littérature élémentaire constitue un réservoir important de la littérature poétique, peut-être même le plus important. On voit parfois dans cette thèse l'essai de dénigrer la grande poésie, l'essai de la réduire au niveau de l'anonymat de l'interdiscours et au collectivisme des stéréotypes — que répondre à cela ? Je crois pourtant avoir rendu suffisamment clair ma conviction, à savoir qu'il ne s'agit nullement de nier ni la 'prodondeur' polysémique ni la richesse en connotations de la poésie, que nul ne saurait être plus sensible que moi au fait que cette poésie seule est capable de donner par elle-même un sens nouveau aux sym-

boles, et cela parfois véritablement à la manière d'un éclair et d'une explosion — ce que j'aimerais pourtant souligner c'est que tous ces effets de fascination proviennent justement du fait que la culture et la littérature élémentaires ont préparé à la poésie le clavier dont elle peut se servir.

Pour terminer, j'aimerais commenter brièvement un passage célèbre du « Prince de Hombourg » de Kleist, qui constitue à lui seul à mon avis un véritable événement discursif. C'est Christa Wolf qui, dans son récit « Kein Ort. Nirgends » (« Aucun lieu : nulle part ») a imaginé la rencontre fictive entre Kleist et Karoline von Günderrode, en l'an 1804. Cette constellation fictive gagnerait en relief si l'on considérait l'usage fait du symbole du ballon par les deux protagonistes. J'ai déjà mentionné le poème de la Günderrode sur le ballon en disant qu'il est caractéristique de la position discursive romantique. Il s'agit de l'essor de l'imagination lyrique vers cet apogée précurseur de l'« Azur » cher à Baudelaire et Mallarmé et qui s'avère précaire puisque le ballon de la poésie n'arrive à vaincre les lois de la pesanteur que temporairement. Par l'acte de son suicide, Karoline von Günderrode semble avoir voulu nier la pesanteur du « réalisme » d'une manière autrement radicale.

Si une telle hypothèse reste pourtant nécessairement hypothétique dans le cas de la Günderrode, elle trouve dans le cas de Kleist un soutien explicite, et cela dans une des lettres d'adieu écrites avant son propre suicide où il est dit : « Le Ciel sait quels étranges sentiments, mi-mélancoliques et mi-joyeux, nous traversent en ce moment où nos âmes s'apprentent à s'élancer au-delà de la Terre comparables à deux aéronautes ». Les paroles risquent de manquer au commentateur lorsqu'il voit comment l'interférence discursive particulière entre religion et science telle qu'elle est propre au symbole collectif du ballon doit servir ici à mettre en œuvre l'expérience du plus risqué des voyages aéronautiques et métaphysiques qu'on puisse imaginer. Et voici mon hypothèse selon laquelle Kleist ne fit pourtant qu'appliquer, par son suicide, son propre discours poétique, en réalisant par sa mort le célèbre monologue du Prince de Hombourg où il est dit :

Je sens que des ailes poussent sur mes épaules
Mon esprit se meut à travers les espaces éthériens
Et, tel un navire qui serait enlevé par le vent
Et verrait s'évanouir au-dessous de lui la ville du port
Ainsi toute vie s'évanouit sous moi
A présent je distingue encore les couleurs et les formes
Et voici que déjà tout devient brouillard au-dessous de moi.

Quel est donc ce navire qui possède des ailes et qui voit s'évanouir le port au-dessous de ses pieds ? A mon avis c'est bel et bien un ballon dont il s'agit. Pour éviter l'anachronisme (car vous savez que le Prince de Hombourg joue au XVII^e siècle), Kleist se sert d'un savant montage afin de donner un équivalent imaginaire du ballon. Si l'on accepte cette hypothèse, on peut faire une découverte supplémentaire. Car on voit alors un rapport étroit entre l'image du ballon et celui du somnambulisme dans la pièce. Le symbolisme de l'électricité comme il s'était développé à la suite du magnétisme de Mesmer, fait éclater exactement de même que celui du ballon la frontière discursive entre religion et science. Kleist a donc choisi, dans le système synchronique des symboles de son temps, exactement les éléments et les positions les plus paradoxales et les plus ambivalentes pour en faire les charnières de son texte. De là, un effet discursif qu'on pourrait appeler de métaphysique matérialiste ou de matérialisme métaphysique, rejetant en même temps la position discursive réaliste et celle romantique et anticipant, comme d'aucuns ont cru voir, certains effets discursifs du surréalisme.

THE SUBVERSION OF THE RITUAL DISCOURSE: AN INTERTEXTUAL READING OF THE LAZARILLO DE TORMES

Antonio GÓMEZ-MORIANA

With the hypothesis that only the existence of a discursive correlation at that time and in Spain, was able to explain the irruption in the *Lazarillo* of the autobiographical fiction which constitutes the characteristic narrative form of the picaresque discourse, and given that the communication circuit that frames this discourse, its very nature, its lexical chart and its narrative program, all point to the confessional practice (whose addressee is God, the confessor or spiritual director, or a tribunal — perhaps that of the Inquisition), a few years ago, we started to look for autobiographical texts that might document the forementioned practice.¹ Our hypothesis was confirmed by the discovery of three autobiographical discourses merging — this is our thesis — in the composition of the *Lazarillo* (although the manner in which the *Lazarillo* uses these discursive practices, almost rituals in Spain at the time, is totally subversive): the so-called « soliloquy » whose addressee is God (or Jesus Christ), discursive practice in which the thanksgiving prayer predominates;

the autobiographical confession intended for the confessor and written upon his request, in which a mostly inner itinerary is developed; finally, the more or less « spontaneous » confession, oral or written for the tribunal of the Inquisition. In the latter, a mostly external itinerary is sketched as an explanation of justification of a given situation. In this confession, in which the juridical discourse predominates, we also find elements pertaining to the first (invocations to God, to Jesus Christ) and to the second (references to one's inner life, to intimate spiritual experiences). Conversely, elements of the third type of confession can be found in the first two. If we consider the *Lazarillo* as a « reading » of the kind of contemporary discourse, there remains no doubt that this reading consists precisely in the disarticulation of its autobiographical value: the subversive (ab)use of said practices puts in evidence the non-authenticity of the autobiographical discourse intended directly or indirectly for the inquisitorial tribunals and produced upon their request.

Let us now retrace the path which has led us to these conclusions. In the first place, we will point out that the search for a correlative to the autobiographical discourse of the *Lazarillo de Tormes* has nothing to do with the traditional search for literary sources. The traditional search for sources isolates the observed elements (motifs, actions, sayings, situations, etc.) without taking into account that, when these elements — identifiable perhaps in previous texts — are integrated into a new unit, they become functions, complementary (or opposites) to other components in the unit. It is the interaction of the parts that creates the new entity. Understanding the functioning of a text as a coherent whole *per se*, and as a unit structured by a principle of correspondance of its parts thus depends much more upon the understanding of the formal — functional — aspect of its integrating elements, than upon the purely scholarly — material — knowledge of the origins or sources of these elements. In neglecting this aspect, traditional literary studies have provoked the violent reaction of structuralism against the historical or diachronic method, to which it opposes the immanent literary study, the so-called synchronic investigation. In reality, this approach to the literary text should be called achronic for placing the text outside the realm of time and for not taking into account other contemporary signification systems related to it. In its first stages, literary structuralism

followed the same path as linguistic structuralism. The latter also started by rejecting all diachrony which it confuses with historical phonetics or the study of the evolution of sounds — phonetic rules —, in favor of phonology or synchronic study of the system in which these sounds are registered and function as basic units, or phonemes.

In the second place, it is clear that our search is also in opposition to this kind of approach to the text, characteristic of the structuralism we have called achronic. We think that capturing simultaneously the function of each element of a text in its new unit on the one hand, and in the unit or units in which they originally organized themselves on the other, allows — by a kind of cross-referentiality — a better understanding of the signification process. There is no question here of the satisfaction that is produced when erudition lets us discover the origin of something. It is rather a question of keeping in mind, while studying the text, the « marking » or semantic load that its components carry — as do all signs — by the mere fact of having been integrated in other systems during their cultural past. Their integration in the new system, the text we are studying — as original as the new purpose and functions assigned to them may be — will not let us ignore what might be called *usage's sanction* which weighs — as does all tradition — upon those elements, components of the text.

All signs are defined by the *selection, restrictions or rules of grammaticality* that limit their use, opposing them at the same time to other signs of the same system. This is a convention that acts upon any writing by reducing the combinatorial possibilities of the elements that — in the paradigmatic axis — make up the available resources, the code shared by the transmitter and the receiver of that writing. Evidently, not all writing limits itself to accurately reproducing that convention. It is also evident that one cannot ignore such a convention, not even (and perhaps even less so) when it is a question of its subversive use to lead the code into delirium. It is for this reason that reading must also take into account the element's « marking » so as to be able to recognize possible mutations or even alienating violations to which the new text sometimes submits those elements (motifs, actions, sayings, situations, etc.) taken from another text or from a textual tradition. Apart from enhancing our

knowledge of the historical evolution of the phrase or element in question, taking into consideration this multiple referentiality (to its « marking » and to its new unit; to the paradigm to which it belongs and to the syntagm in which it is anchored by being part of the text) leads the way to an understanding of the text itself it is this signifying dynamics or sense-producing process that arranges it historically more as a merger of texts put into dialogue than as only the finished product of an author. For this reason, Kristeva, following Bakhtin, speaks of the text as an « espace dialogique. »² The element integrated into text becomes with it, a connotative sign because of its multiple referents (in opposition to the purely denotative character of the monologue). The text itself, being capable of functioning in various isotopies, — connotated simultaneously by its polysemous components — may generate different readings, including conflicting ones. Therefore, the *comprehension* of such a text requires an *intertextual reading* that takes into consideration this cross-referentiality that transforms it into a manner of junction of the roads where « allusions » join (or branch off). These allusions breach the syntagmatic linearity of the text-reading by virtually presenting, without the need of an explicit development, the stories, ideas, myths that their components bring to the mind of the reader as a result of the semantic load of their cultural past. Thus, these components function as *anaphoric elements* — not in the transphrastic sense, but in the transtextual one — and therefore transform the reference text into a *co-text* indispensable for the understanding of the text in question. If the study of the co-text uncovers in the « marking » of its cultural past the selection restrictions or *rules of grammaticality* that restrict its use, we shall then be able to evaluate the degree of faithfulness or unfaithfulness, to the convention on the part of the new text whose purpose may range from simple reproduction to distance-creating irony, to parody or to total subversion.

Let us take as an example the anecdote that is told to illustrate both the sexual ambiguity and the wit that scholarly literary criticism has attributed to Don Jacinto Benavente. It is said that, upon meeting him in a fiesta, Doña Emilia Pardo Bazán greeted him with these words: « Your head is lovely, but sexless »*: to which Don Jacinto

* In Spanish: « Tu cabeza es hermosa, pero sin sexo ».

answered: « Said the fox to the bust after sniffing at it. » Let us consider for a moment the two sentences uttered by Doña Emilia and Don Jacinto in this anecdote. Both are almost literal replicas of passages from a text — the fable of the fox and the bust** — which is not only the inspirational source but also the code shared by both speakers that renders communication between them possible. The substitution of the phoneme /ks/ in lieu of /s/ in the passage reproduced by Doña Emilia Pardo Bazán alters substantially the original text without effectively erasing its identification marks — its belonging to the fable. The new referentiality created by the communicative circuit in which Doña Emilia utters her textual sequence, on addressing to Don Jacinto allocutionally also promotes an important change in the referent of the possessive adjective: it is Don Jacinto who becomes the possessor in lieu of the bust. The substitution of a phoneme and of the possessive adjective's referent, even as it reminds the listener of the fable and respects the fragmentary nature of the sequence, has the latter say something that was not registered in its former tradition. These are alienations that generate meaning and thus, what in a first reading might seem a mere « rhetorical recital, » has been transformed into an ambiguous play of words, offsetting the insult. It is the ambiguity created by the alienating use of the fable's passage and Don Jacinto's immediate recognition of the co-text that afford him a brilliant exist line. Thanks to the explicitly atemporal character of the statement as it appears in the fable, Don Jacinto distorts Doña Emilia's change of referent. This is the first result of Don Jacinto's citation of the passage corresponding to the narrator's presentation: « Said the fox to the bust. » However, we are very soon conscious of the ambiguity of that sentence. Although the verb « said » in itself directs attention to the atemporal enunciation of the fable, it also connotes the utterance that Doña Emilia has just made, so that « fox » and « bust » are understood as interchangeable with « Doña Emilia » and « Don Jacinto. »

The short analysis we have made of the anecdote must be completed by considering its function when it is told today. One has to suppose that the listener knows the fable recalled by the text as a co-text. One also has to suppose that the listener knows of Don

** La Fontaine, *Le renard et le buste*. « belle bête, dit-il, mais de cervelle, point » (in Spanish: « Tu cabeza es hermosa, pero sin seso »).

Jacinto Benavente's sexual inclination as presented by scholarly literary criticism, which explains in this way the sensitiveness to the feminine soul that is deemed present in Benavente's dramatic work. The anecdote is therefore a transtextual anaphora, a text which is only understandable by means of a transtextual recourse to the fable of the fox and the bust and to the scholarly criticism of Benavente's work. These co-texts are acting components of the anecdote's text by virtue of the cross-referentiality we mentioned earlier, itself formed by the presupposed information without which communication would remain blocked by the absence of a code shared by the narrating transmitter and the listening receiver.

In the *Lazarillo*, we encounter this type of ambiguity in the alienating use of an intertextual referent. Thus, for example, when Lázaro says (in the first *tractado*) of his father that he « confessed and did not deny, » the same two verbs with which the Gospel describes Jesus' attitude upon being interrogated by the High Priest on his messianic calling, are used to refer to « certain awkward slashes in the sacks » (that is to say, larceny) of which the miller of Tormes was accused. The text immediately adds yet another citation taken from the Scriptures (as if the first one were not sufficiently suggestive): « and he suffered persecution *por justicia*. » With this reminder of the Sermon on the Mount, Lázaro comes to the conclusion that his father must be in heaven, the co-text explicitly declaring: « for the Gospel calls them blessed » (those who suffer that particular persecution). Nonetheless, the sentence is ambiguous. « Justice, » in the interpretation of the Beatitudes sanctioned by catechisms, is a cardinal virtue. In the text of the *Lazarillo*, on the contrary, this sentence — by appearing in the sequence of events as the subsequent step and logical conclusion of admitting larceny — means that his father was juridically condemned (precisely for acts contrary to the virtue of justice). It is the preposition « por »* with its double function of passive phrase formant and final cause indicator, joined with the polysemy of the word « justice, » that allows the ambiguity of the sentence whose meaning will be clarified later by Lázaro when he describes in the last *tractado*, his profession of town-crier. This profession consists in, amongst other things, « escorting those who suffer persecution for by justice and calling out their offences. »

* In Spanish, *por* means « for » and « by. »

At other times, Lázaro uses lexical items or set phrases, sanctioned by use as belonging to the spiritual lexicon (ascetic and mystic), to express his most elemental material needs. Let us take as an example, a passage from the second *tractado*. In the middle of the stratagems that, being in the service of the cleric from Maqueda, Lázaro has to resort to in order to penetrate the bread chest, he tells of the comfort he experiences by looking at it when hunger gnaws at him most, with borrowings from the spiritual literature:

I, to comfort myself, open the chest and as I saw the bread, commenced to adore it, not daring to receive it³.

To interpret this example, we now have to pass from the paradigmatic axis — the selection axis — to the syntagmatic axis — the combination axis —, in order to clarify a new dimension in our study of texts which we shall call *interdiscursivity*.


Up until now, we have been able to see how, in a textual analysis, we may single out elements that one text borrows from others, by insisting on the mechanism for the production of meaning of those elements which are in a dialectic tension between their original « marking » and their function in the new phrase that incorporates them. By generalizing, we think we may declare that *all texts* are constructed as a kind of mosaic where very disparate elements taken from the cultural legacy of a social group or cultural community, are organized. Evidently, each new writing submits these elements to a new purpose but it cannot ignore their origin. We will give this phenomena the name of *borrowing*, using the terminology commonly accepted in historical linguistics and in the study of interlinguistic contacts. To distinguish it from the *lexical borrowing* of one language from another, object of linguistic studies, we shall add the qualifier *textual*. With this term, we indicate at the same time, the nature of the interchange — the intertextuality — and the object of the change, the unit which is called *text* because it is a whole unto itself. This unit, however, can consist of a lexeme or a set phrase; a sentence or group of sentences; a situation or motif more or less elaborated or subtly recalled by simple allusion. We call *intertextual reading* the identification of the *textual borrowing* in the new unit or text that assimilates it, the study of the possible interferences of the

semantic load or « marking » of its cultural past in the new function, as well as the mutations, including violations of said borrowing that the adoption of the new function may bring forth in the new unit.

In addition to incorporating elements of the surrounding cultural patrimony, a text will use the combinatorial rules or discursive practices in force in the cultural community in which it is produced. Only in this manner can it be elaborated and accepted as such by the addressee that all textual production presupposes. Evidently, *interdiscursivity* does not consist only in obeying the discursive rules of a given model. Along with the realization of the model, we find its modification and transgression, its mixing with other models, its alienation and parody, its total subversion. We only wish to note its presence, whether in the form of the most slavish copy or in the form of the most radical dialectic opposition. Indeed even when it is a matter of the code of a specific discursive practice being led into delirium by the subversion of such a practice — as we believe is the case in the *Lazarillo* —, the object of the parodical manipulation, or of the subversive counter-manipulation, is to be found in the laws or precepts that define that discursive code: it is the exaggerated faithfulness to such precepts or their de-motivation that ridicule a discursive practice, just as the de-construction or the transcoding of the practice consists in a disarticulation of those precepts which will then serve as the basis for the formation of a new type of discourse.

The *intertextual reading* must also put in evidence the reality of the intersecting of codes or discursive practices in a text, its *interdiscursivity* by means of the identification of what we shall call *discursive calque*, completing the analogy to *textual borrowing*. We also take the term *calque* from interlinguistics which speaks of the *semantic calque* to indicate the type of lexical construction that one language adopts from another by translating its components. The Spanish words *balonpié* or *baloncesto* are semantic calques of the corresponding English words *football* and *basketball* respectively. By analogy, we call *discursive calque* the adoption by a text of one or various forms of discourse in the strategic ordering of its components.

Let us return to the quotation from the second *tractado* of the *Lazarillo* which we had promised to clarify above:



I, to comfort myself, open the chest, and as I saw the bread, commenced to adore it, not daring to receive it.

To find comfort through adoration when, for considering one's self unworthy — whether due to a disposition to scrupulousness or to the fact of being in a state of sin —, one does not dare receive the Eucharist, is one of the recommendations very frequently found in Counter-Reform spiritual treatises. What is at stake here is putting in evidence the multiple effects of the *true, real* and *substantial* presence of Christ in the Eucharistic species and the legitimacy of adoring the reserve of Eucharistic bread kept in the tabernacle, two practices challenged by the Protestant Reform. Thus we identify the text as a borrowing from ascetic and mystic literature. However, the *Lazarillo's* use of this textual borrowing goes much further than merely quoting or appropriating lexical elements. By using the first person, Lázaro incorporates these verbs into a personal experience which he describes, adopting the code pertaining to the discursive practice of the confession. The *discursive calque* reinforces so much the lexical « marking » of the Eucharistic spirituality with the words *chest* and *bread* in relation with *open, adore, receive*, all framed by the verb *comfort* — with its counterpoint — *not dare receive*, that, on taking the text out of its real context, we forget the sequence of events in which it appears in the *Lazarillo*: after having noticed the disappearance of some bread rolls from his chest, to which Lázaro has obtained a key, the cleric from Maqueda counts them and takes good note of his reserves; Lázaro, famished, has no other recourse but to open the chest and comfort himself by looking at the bread; he does not dare eat it for fear his master will notice the shortage. The text's ambiguity is perfect as both isotopies can organize all their component elements. But the opposition between both readings is such that one cannot understand the use of the discursive practice of confession as anything but a rupture of the syntagmatic linearity in which the events are ordered chronologically, thus highlighting the discourse itself rather than the events that are narrated. In view of this highlighting by the *discursive calque*, if we reread the tractado in its entirety, we will discover in it the merging of a series of indicators. The tractado becomes a discursive transposition converting the festive and jovial tone of the narrative of the folkloric anecdotes of

the Lázaro-blindman pair (object of the first tractado) into a kind of a mystic delirium in which the hunger-related stratagems are arranged into a confessional discourse giving testimony to a series of inner incidents, spiritual states and crisis, in relation to which the external events appear to be placed on a double level: providential and ill-fated.

At suche times I found ease in nothing but in death (...) And being in such affliction (God of his grace deliver every faithfull Christian from the like) not knowing how to counsell my selfe, my miserydaylincreasing, upon a day (...) there arived by chance to the dore a tinker, which I believe was an Angel disguised, sente from God (...) (by divine inspiration) I saide unto him (...) the heavenly tinker began to assay, nowe one key, now another, of his great bunch, and I helped him with my prayers, so that immediatly before I was aware, he opened it: whereof I was so gladde, that mee thought I did see in figure, (as they say) the face of God, when I beheld the bread within it (...) Incontinently after, who commeth in, but my unhappy master, and as God would, he never tooke heed of the loafe, which the heavenly tinker had borrowed. The next day after, as soone as he went abroade, I began to open my paradise of bread, and what betweene my hands and teeth, with the twinkling of an eye I made a loafe invisible, forgetting in no wise to lock the chest againe: than I began cheerefully to sweepe the house, judging that by such remedy I might ease my sorowfull life. So I passed that day and the nexte... But my contrary Fortune went aboute to hinder mee to enjoye suche pleasure long...

(p. 28-29).

Here we have seen some of the indicators preparing the text we comment. After this text, we also read:

I was almost dead (...) wherefore being alone, I did nothing but open and locke againe the coffer, beholding alwayes the bread as God. And God himself which succoureth those that are afflicted, seeing me in such necessitie, brought a little remedie to my memorie...

(p. 29)

The well-known « little remedy » — to feign that mice are entering the chest and gnawing at the bread — lasts very little, given the cleric's diligence in blocking all entry to the presumed mice. In view of such diligence, Lázaro exclaims:

Lord God, unto howe many perils and calamities of Fortune are humaine creatures subject? how short a time doe the pleasures of our troublesome life last? lo where I am now, whiche trusted by this my poore remedie, to ease my miserie, being in beste hope of good adventure, my evill lucke would not consent, but opened the sighte of my covetous maisters understanding, causing him to have more subtile wit than he had given him by nature, although such wretches are commonly subtile enough. When he had dummed up the holes, I thought his chest shoulde bee shutte to my comforte, and opened to my paine.

(p. 30-31)

Lázaro will try once more to maintain the illusion of mice penetrating into the chest by perforating the chest himself, using a knife as a tool. Lázaro's commentary on the opening of the « wound on the side » wavers between the erotic insinuation — as does the entire motif of the mice — and the conjuring-up of Christ's Passion whose recollection is brought about precisely by the (symbolic) meaning of « breaking the bread » in the Eucharistic celebration:

I gave the assault with my rustie knife, which served my tourne wel for a wimble: but the chest by reason of good yeeres, beeing weake, without strength, very soft and tender, did straight wayes render and consent that I should make for my commoditie a good hole in the side of it, and that done, opening the wounded chest, and knowing everye loafe severally by the touch, I did as I had done before, and by that meanes beeing somewhat comforted, having locked the chest againe, I returned to my pallet, whereupon I slept little.

(p. 31-32)

In the majority of cases, the intertextual reading reveals a correspondance between the conveyed elements and the type of discourse which conveys them. The textual borrowing and the discursive calque usually go hand in hand in a coherent complementary. But it is not always so. The subversion of one or the other (or both at the same time) can rest precisely on the non-conformity between the text's two levels. It is this non-conformity, for example, that makes Fray Gerundio's sermons grotesque, as there is no correspondance between the ritual discursive practice of predication and the information given in said predication. If, in the example we have taken from the *Lazarillo*, the series of indicators brought forth as signs upholding the spiritual tone in Lázaro's confessional discourse might give the impression of perfect coherency, it will suffice to bring forth now the series of allusions to very mundane things intermingling in the text with borrowings from the spiritual lexicon in order to realize that they serve as counterpoints and create a double tension in the text: on one hand between the components themselves, and on the other, between these components and the discourse which assumes them. It is a matter, then, of filling in the suspension points with which we cut the quoted text. This reveals that the «death» in which Lázaro finds respite is none other than the death of his neighbours in the village (death that Lázaro beseeches of God, turning himself into an «enemy of human nature» because, «in the mortuary house, we ate well and I had my fill»); the contemplation of the bread consoles Lázaro of the «past diet» which had made hunger start to gnaw at his stomach. We have already seen, in the mice's skirmishes, the tension produced by the play between the erotic and the sacred. All these tensions, forging a kind of «contradictio in terminis», undermine the sacred nature of the textual borrowings from the spiritual lexicon and completely alienate the discursive calque, showing thus, an ungrammatical (ab)use of it.

Edmond Cros has dedicated an interesting chapter in his book, *L'aristocrate et le carnaval des gueux. Etude sur le «Buscón» de Quevedo*, to what he calls «le discours usurpé.»⁴ Basing himself on Bakhtin's study of Rabelais,⁵ Cros distinguishes two discourses in the *Buscón* («discours qui masque» and «[discours] qui démasque») laying with this distinction, the foundations of the basic thesis of his work: the *Buscón* consists of two texts which «dans certains cas se

juxtaposent et, dans d'autres, se recourent.» As a first example of the superposition of the two texts, Cros singles out the parodical glosses introduced by copulative conjunctions, whose function is to explicit the preceding proposition's polysemy: «In my youth, I always went to church, and not only as a good christian» — says Pablos of himself; «They say he was from good stock and from the amount he drank, it had to be true» — says Pablos of his father. In his commentary on those texts, Cros takes the viewpoint of Francisco Rico who considers the glosses psychologically implausible because he thinks that the statement made in the second element of these sentences could not have originated precisely with one who tries to deny his blood ties. Rico compares Pablo's «jokes» with Lázaro's «subtilities» in these terms:

Lázaro would have simply insinuated: «they say he was of good stock». But Pablos does not appreciate the kind of subtlety which makes the *Lazarillo* a masterpiece of ironic truth: he cannot abide that the least thing escape us and he hurries to gloss the joke with an addition that makes it transparent, even at the cost of robbing all plausibility from his stated intention of «denying his blood ties.» This happens to him as writer and as personage. A crying example. When, dressed as the King of Roosters with a feathered hat, the stallholders and the youngsters assail him with «carrots, turnips, eggplants and other vegetables», as would have happened to a publicly shamed sorceress, Pablos starts yelling: «Sisters, although I wear feathers, I am not Aldonza de San Pedro, my mother.» Absurd. More or less amusing, but incredible. Nobody would say such a thing under such circumstances, and Pablos least of all. Here, one hears but his master's voice⁶.

By «master's voice», Rico means the voice of the author, Francisco de Quevedo, as he says explicitly some lines after the quoted passage, repeating once more that these words coming «from the *Buscón*'s mouth are impossible.»

Basing himself on Rico's observations, Cros exposes the nerve center of «center of gravity» (as he calls it) of the *Buscón* by bringing to the fore the fact that all the superpositions in both texts function

around lexicalized expressions (*to go to church, to be of good stock*) that on a first reading denote social values, as are piety and nobility, but on being integrated into the textual flow, « dans le réseau sémantique allusif du second texte », each one of these set phrases or lexicalised expressions « éclate et se délexicalise. »

What Rico criticizes then, in the *Buscón*'s text, is, — using the terminology we propose — the fact that the sentences coordinated with, and following the textual borrowings, bring about the destruction of the borrowing's marking in its traditional and popular usage, cultural repertory from which they have been taken. According to Rico, an attentive reader would be capable of inferring such a destruction by himself. In replying to Rico, Cros refers to the problem's discursive dimension, establishing the discourse as the object of that characteristic de-mystification to which the carnivalesque system operating in the *Buscón* must be submitted :

Mais en réalité l'expression lexicalisée est elle-même conçue comme élément d'un discours mystificateur dont la dénonciation doit être explicite.⁷

As for us, we shall have to add that we do not agree with what Rico says of the *Lazarillo*. We have already seen how the *Lazarillo* creates explicitly and in the same lexical flow, the neutralization of borrowed elements by means of a contextual alienation that denounces at the same time the disproportion between the text's components and the discourse that conveys them. We also think we should point out that Rico's reading seems to be a typical example of the superficial reading of a literary work's ideological dimension. He looks at social elements that surface materially in the text — the purity of caste in the *Buscón*, the case of dishonour in the *Lazarillo* — to which he applies a criterion of plausibility that is not necessarily the speaker's but our own, in the monologism that Bakhtin so rightly describes, opposing it to the dialogism, specific to the polyphonic novel.⁸ Rico does not take notice of the discursive calque, of the actualization or possible denunciation of the very discourse that is used. As Michel Foucault noted in his inaugural class in the *Collège de France*,⁹ apart from being the medium which discloses (or hides) the desire for power as well as being the exponent of the struggle


for, or system of, dominance; the discourse is precisely the very object of the wish for, and the practice of power. This is why we consider, for our part, much more important than the anecdotes (outlines of customs, representation of the social strata by the characters, etc.) that surface in any work of art, the discourse itself that is used and its « marking », as well as the degree of submission or subversion to which it is subjected by the text, object of study. As we saw, not only the textual elements that a text borrows have a marking. The discourse that is used also has its own. This marking consists of the ideology that upholds the discursive practice as it imposes selection restrictions that regulate its use. This is a socio-cultural variable that must absolutely be taken into account when interpreting a discursive calque.

Foucault states that: « Dans toute société la production du discours est à la fois contrôlée, sélectionnée, organisée et redistribuée par un certain nombre de procédures qui ont pour rôle d'en conjurer les pouvoirs et les dangers, d'en maîtriser l'événement aléatoire, d'en esquiver la lourde, la redoutable matérialité ». With these words, Foucault resumes in the work we have already mentioned, the discursive-social relationship, a question we will examine briefly to facilitate a better comprehension of what we understand by « subversion of the ritual discourse. » The control that any society exercises over the discursive production within itself — whatever type of discourse it may be — can be studied in a double dimension :

I — Society dictates precepts — an apparently positive aspect — which, in reality, are restrictions on usage, in that they specify each discourse's legitimate subject, object and circumstances. Foucault speaks for this reason of a triple prohibition or exclusion and mentions the « taboo of the object », the « ritual of circumstances » and the « privileged or exclusive right of the subject » as external boundaries of the discourse.

II — Society, in the name of what Foucault calls the « wish for truth » rejects the « false » discourse, creating the internal boundary or operating law of each type of discourse.

Within these two coordinates, in which each component functions as a variable dependent of the « épistème » in force, as Foucault states in *Les mots et les choses*,¹⁰ the changing criteria of verisimilitude in the occidental literary discourse (in many forms) are



explained by laws specific to each literary genre and according to the «illusion of truth» with which its addressee (the public or the reader) goes along. The scientific discourse also has its laws with the result that in it, it is more a question of «being true» to the science than of telling the truth. Even the economic and juridical discourses, by imposing norms, try to legitimize their procedures (the first with a wealth and production theory, the second with a theory of law and of sociological and medical sciences) as «criteria of truth.» The rhetorical precepts, the «decorum» or observation of poetic value and censorship, the justification of the speaking subject and his relation to the object of his utterance and to the circumstances of its enunciation, of the act of communication itself, all these follow a kind of *ritual* that distinguishes the truthful discourse from the false one in all societies.

If we consider all these restrictions that society imposes regarding the use of a specific type of discourse, as criteria of its suitability, the *grammaticality* or *ungrammaticality* of the discourse will be the consequence of the concurrence or the non-concurrence in a specific discourse and in given contextual circumstances, of the conditions imposed by the society in which it is registered. This is what we will call the *discursive norm*. In the light of this norm, we shall have to interpret the use or (ab)use that the discursive calque in question makes of the chosen discursive model.

It is evident that when we speak here of the adoption by a text of operating discursive models — and although the theory we are trying to elaborate has as its primary objective the understanding of the literary text's functioning — we are not referring necessarily to models condoned by rhetoric, or to literary genres. On the contrary, we can observe that all literary texts use and abuse discursive models taken from the natural, colloquial, scientific or technical language by having both the basic speaker and other characters produced theological, judicial, economic or administrative, etc. discourses. More still, we believe that the genetic explanation of all literary genres — if we study in depth their linguistic roots — will perforce be bound in the expansion potential virtually inherent in the *communication structures* or units that are syntactically simpler and that belong to the everyday expressions of the natural language. Thus, the transformation made possible by what Greimas calls the

«principe de l'expansion sémantique»¹¹ must account for the formation of more complex structures from simpler communication structures. Aristotles had already inferred the major literary genres (Epos and Drama) from the inclusion of new episodes in the narrative scheme of a simple story or anecdote, distinguishing the epic procedure from the dramatic one according to whether the different stories integrated themselves or not in a unique common axis.

In the study of the subsequent evolution of an already established literary genre, one also has to keep in mind the boundaries drawn by the precepts that define it on one hand, without forgetting on the other, the potential for expansion inherent in the dynamic structure of the genre in evolution, along with its power to generate an infinite number of combinatorial possibilities from these precepts while taking into account the restrictions they impose.

Following what we have said, an adequate explanation of the literary genre's genesis, as well as an authentically historical and literary explanation of its subsequent evolution, require a profound reformulation of the precepts and their interpretation as transformation rules that define and condition the generating mechanism of the text. The text's acceptability or grammaticality, as we have said, will depend on the correct use of the rules and on respecting the selection restrictions of the integrated elements. Its ungrammaticality, on the contrary, will point to the subversion of the rules or transgression of the selection restrictions that characterize the text's components. This ungrammaticality, far from meaning the rejection of the result arrived at, can, on the contrary, become a sign of ideological subversion or rebellion against conditions imposed by the society in which this phenomena is produced. Perhaps this might be one of the characteristics or of the specificity of literary discourse as opposed to the discourse of everyday communication. It is in this context that we think we should interpret the «originalidad artística» that María Rosa Lida de Malkiel would discover in the *Celestina*. The *Celestina*'s rupture with the noble tradition, by raising to the level of poetic object ruffians and whores integrated into the text and treated with the depth and seriousness that the poetic norm usually reserved for noble heroes and their «lofty deeds» (Aristotle's expression in his *Poetics*), is like a *creative ungrammaticality* which opens new vistas to literary expression by breaking the taboos we described some pages ago, following Michel Foucault.

Our interpretation of the *Lazarillo* also follows that line, although it encompasses at the same time the poetic object, the narrator-subject himself and, especially, the « ritual of circumstances » and the « wish for truth » of its autobiographical confessional discourse. It is this we call « subversion of the ritual discourse ».

Before attempting the detailed study of each of the circumstances of the *discursive calque's* « ungrammaticality » as it appears in the *Lazarillo*, we still have to explain the method of reading the interaction we have already pointed out between the discursive practice and the *ideology* or socio-cultural variable that sustains said practice and dictates the norms of its use. The Russian formalists had already seen, in the analysis of the literary work as an immanent system, only a point of departure for the detailed study of such work. Their study had to take into account, apart from the internal system of the functioning and interrelation of the work's components, the relation of these components to the work in its entirety and the relation of the work to the national literature, to the genre and to the global system with which any genre is correlated. Just as the fact of isolating one element while analyzing the work — necessarily brought about by the inequality of the components — is nothing more than a working procedure, as, in reality, one has to look for the meaning of each element in its relationship with other constituents; so the fact of isolating a work, while studying its components, is nothing more than the first step towards the subsequent understanding of its relationship with other systems including other series of systems of signification. Only in this way will we understand it as « differential sign, » as Tynjanov defines it.¹² On the basis of this reality, Julia Kristeva proposes the substitution of the old classic rhetoric's classification of literary genres by a « typologie des textes. » By this typology, Kristeva means the definition of the specificity of the different textual organizations which places them in the culture's general text, of which they are part and which, in its turn, is part of them. This mutual relation between text and historico-social coordinates, that intertextuality should uncover « matérialisé aux différents niveaux de la structure de chaque texte, » is called « idéologème », by Kristeva. She takes the term from the Russian post-formalist critic, Medvedev and defines it as :

le foyer dand lequel la rationalité connaissante saisit la transformation des énoncés (auxquels le texte est irréductible) en un *tout* (le texte), de même que les insertions de cette totalité dans le texte historique et social.¹³

We think we are able to read this convergence in the different modalities of what we have called the *discursive calque*, level at which we would situate the text's *ideologème*. This is because we consider the discursive level as the privileged setting in which the text's laws (any law is the expression of an ideology) converge with the symbols which every society itself (visualization of the ideology itself). The *discursive calque* is always a « reading » of these laws and symbols which it reproduces, by more or less consciously paying a tribute to the ideology, or opposes, by rejecting it. It is for this reason that all societies take such care in controlling the discursive production, as we have seen with Foucault. It is also for this reason that all social subversion starts with questioning the laws and the symbols of its discursive practices. Because, insofar as the most elemental structure of human communication takes shape by finding its expression in the discourse — necessary step of any deep structure which only manifests itself through the superficial textual or prosal structure —, it is already implicated in a concrete social and cultural reality. This dimension of the discursive production has not always been kept in mind by the generative school. Nevertheless, to us, its importance appears to be decisive, not only for literary production but for all discursive uses. Here we have the root of the concern shown by those *generativists* who, trying to cope with the socio-cultural reality when defining linguistic competence, have formed the concept of « communicative competence » or « pragmatic competence. » This is the generative grammar's component which, by taking into account psycho-linguistic and socio-linguistic aspects of the relationship between competence and performance — and beyond the rules of grammaticality dictated by syntax, morphophonology and semantics —, proposes to account for those underlying systems in the *use and acceptance of pertinent elements and discursive practices at the right time and in the appropriate situation*.¹⁴ By taking into account this component — transferring the generative grammar's phrasal terminology to the textual production —, we have insisted on the

socio-cultural variable which determines the selection restrictions or discursive markings in what we have called the *discursive norm*. Trying to go a step further in this direction, we have presumed to include those components essential in all discourses into the *grammaticality* of the latter. Indeed, the grammaticality of the discourse cannot be systematized by using only the linguistic categories mentioned above: the pertinence of a discourse depends in any society primarily and essentially on the « ritual of circumstances » in which it is produced, that is, on its appropriateness to the given time and situation.

Any application of the generative grammar will thus have to bear in mind the various socio-cultural situations liable to explain the appearance of certain particular types of discourses at a given time, their success, disappearance or reappearance at a certain moment; and also, the circumstances of their modification by way of reduction or elimination of elements that formed them previously, by way of expansion or insertion of new elements, by way of substitution or permutation of others.

As an example or a practical and global application of the principles we are expounding, let us look at the inclusion in the *Lazarillo* of the folkloric motif of the blindman-youth pair. By being integrated into a syntagmatic axis — the narration of Lázaro de Tormes's life of which « they are part » — those elements from the folkloric tradition become purely functional entities, syntactic elements with no other meaning but their relation the development and finality of the story in its entirety. They have become the arbitrary props of a « function », defined by Propp as:

l'action d'un personnage définie du point de vue de sa signification dans le déroulement de l'intrigue.¹⁵

The perception as such of the inserted motif nevertheless forces upon us an intertextual reading that, by identifying the motif, accounts for its different uses and meanings, for the tradition to which it belongs on the diachronic axis and for the cultural marking or « myth » that the pair bring to mind. The new appearance of the theme will not only enrich or sustain its tradition of *signifiés* just as recognizing it in *Lazarillo* will not only give us scholarly data on

those elements that form part of it. By bearing in mind in our reading the double referentiality mentioned above, we cannot but perceive a dialectic tension between both poles.

As Edmond Cros has demonstrated in his paper « Le folklore dans le *Lazarillo* de Tormes: nouvel examen. Problèmes méthodologiques, »¹⁶ a comparison between the medieval farces and illustrations in the *Decretales* of the youth-blindman pair, which Foulché Delbosc discovered at the end of the last century, and the same couple in the *Lazarillo*, makes obvious the evolution of christianity's view of poverty of begging and of giving alms through the intervening centuries. If the medieval church, by exalting the scorn for wordly goods, makes of the poor, a living image of Christ, and of poverty, the highest of virtues; at the beginning of the XVI^e century, the poor appears — above all for Protestantism — on par with the fool and the demoniac. To give alms is not to give succor to God anymore, but to feed the devil. Cros explains this evolution, which makes of poverty a social malady instead of a virtue, by the appearance of new social and economic structures. Above all, the need to procure an abundant labor pool for the pre-capitalistic type of production, together with the wish to do in vagrancy, is what determines the change in attitude towards the poor, including the underprivileged. Vives states in his treatise:

Ni aún se ha de consentir que los ciegos estén o anden ociosos; son muchas las faenas en que pueden ejercitarse.¹⁷

With this change in perspective, Cros explains the appearance of the blindman in the *Lazarillo* as a diabolic character and Lázaro's passage from a state of innocence to knowing « a bit more than the devil » (as he demonstrates when he takes leave of the blindman with a final blow to the head). Indeed, the blindman-Lázaro interrelation is presented in the text by means of a whole range of diabolical connotations, as observes Cros. It is above all the escalating duel, that opposes both characters throughout all of the first chapter or tractado, which constitutes, in Cros's words, « un duel de personnages diaboliques, comme l'indique explicitement la convergence des expressions qui servent à qualifier les agressions respectives des deux antagonistes. »¹⁸

If the change of social, economic and religious perspective explains the insertion of the motif into a determined tradition and the time-frame of this tradition which the *Lazarillo* echoes, passing now to the discursive level will enable us to deepen our understanding of the function that those borrowings taken from the folkloric tradition play in the development of the *Lazarillo story*, by being part of the life experiences narrated by Lázaro.

We will also better understand the tension created between the type of discourse selected to narrate these experiences and the changing signifié of the folkloric short stories; that is, between the discursive calque and the textual borrowing that constitute the text we are dealing with.

If there is a point on which modern criticism of the *Lazarillo* is in complete agreement, it is in considering this work as an *autobiographical fiction*, acknowledging in its unknown author — beyond the reservations voiced by critics such as Camille Pitollé, Marcel Bataillon, Valbuena Prat and others¹⁹ what Francisco Rico calls:

the gift to gather together intemporal themes and pretenses, valid in any circumstance, in a construction so skillfully situated in time and in space, that they gave the impression of being indissolubly linked to it.²⁰

Such are — in Rico's words — the «subtlety and cleverness with which the *Lazarillo* reelaborates extraneous motifs» which «have become... the narrative's flesh and blood, integrated into a living organism whose members are mutually implicated, and where setting aside any one of them would lead to a disastrous mutilation.» Rico explains in this way the critics' delay in acknowledging the independence of the folkloric motifs borrowed by the *Lazarillo*. And from this, Rico infers, as had before Américo Castro, Claudio Guillén and Lázaro Carreter²¹ what he calls the *Lazarillo de Tormes*' «singular transcendence in the history of the modern novel» which consists precisely in:

the art of selecting and conjoining pieces of various origins, in order to give them a cohesion and meaning in the dependency of the central figure brilliantly depicted and — above all — individualized.²²

Can there be more perfect harmony? From entertaining serious doubts about the integrity of the text that has reached us, critics have come to recognize the *Lazarillo*'s exemplary architecture. Let us return for a moment to Cros' thesis on the evolution of the blindman's signifié which converts him into a diabolic personage. The change in the economic, social and religious opinion, brought about during the *Lazarillo*'s composition, allows per se, its inclusion in an autobiography that wishes to give an account of the school in which its narrator — naïf-rusé — «made his way in life.» Counter to Baader's scruples²³ about the narration's ethical contents which, according to him, requires the use of the first person because an external observer would have to condemn such infamies, this new social attitude permits Lázaro's treatment of the blindman and removes much of the cruelty from the final vengeance: the victim of the vengeance is, in the last analysis, the devil himself. Acceptance of the ideology on the part of the *Lazarillo*?

We are in the presence of a double-edged blade. If we maintain that the *Lazarillo* really accepts the ideology of the diabolic character of poverty, which would ethically justify Lázaro's attitude towards the blindman, when the time comes to solve the problem of his ethical verisimilitude, we shall come to realize that Lázaro, being a beggar also, could not be an esthetic object according to that ideology. [This is where Américo Castro found the explanation for the use of the autobiographical discourse]. But this solution complicates the problem even more, as, along with the object, we would also have to justify the speaking subject himself. Lázaro Carreter would perhaps answer that Vuestra Merced's making Lázaro the butt of a joke by asking him an account of his case, in precisely the explanation of why this poor devil speaks out or puts pen to paper. But such a clever device is not without its problems. From our study of the deeds kept in the *Archivo Histórico Nacional* of Madrid, we believe we can state that, demanding of one who stands on the fringe of society — by means of monitions — an account of his life and thus wringing from him a confession, occurred frequently enough in the Spain in which the *Lazarillo* was produced, but was much too serious a matter by reason of its ritual character, given «circumstances» in which it happened — in the juridical and religious confines of the Inquisition — to be the object of a simple joke.

Therefore, the only possibility of fulfilling the three requirements of the type of discourse which is the object of the calque in the *Lazarillo*, would be to map it on the true biographical act of confession. The subject who speaks — unacceptably within the frame of a literary autobiography of that era, because not fulfilling the requirements of *decorum* then in force — would be justified by the judge who interrogates him. In the same manner, the object, not very edifying from an ethical standpoint and excessively non-heroic in terms of the epic norm inherited by the Spanish Renaissance novel — thus an unethical and non-rhetorical object — would be justified by becoming the object of a confession. In this hypothesis, the ritual of circumstances amply justifies both the subject of the enunciation and the enunciated object of Lázaro's confessional discourse. It is here precisely that the folkloric anecdotes appear, within the frame of our hypothesis, with a completely *new signifié*, as evidence of the *non-veracity* of a ritual discourse — the confession — whose major quality has to be truthfulness before God and man. Any biographical discourse would be revealed as spurious — as fiction — by the mere fact of including the narration of folkloric, that is to say, well-known anecdotes which irremediably destroy the individual, unique and non-repeatable character, specific to, and defining the type of experiences which are the object of the autobiographical narrative. Fiction here simply means « literature », and the autobiographical fiction enjoys citizenship status in European Renaissance literature. Except that, as we have already shown, neither the subject nor the object conform to the norms of such a fiction. Furthermore, if we add the fact that we are dealing with an autobiography of a confessional nature — and we believe that the passages taken from the second tractado of the *Lazarillo* and commented rather extensively as examples of what we call interdiscursivity, are eloquent enough as evidence in that sense —, the folkloric anecdotes are not a sign of the autobiographical discourse's alienation in the sense of calling it fictitious or literary, but are rather a radical subversion of the autobiographical confession as a discursive practice.

If we consider, then, the *Lazarillo* as a « reading » (for being a discursive calque) of the ritual discursive practice that was the autobiographical confession spoken before (or written for) the Inquisition tribunal, given all the contradictions and problems of *ungrammati-*

cality this calque presents, we cannot but maintain that such a « reading » consists precisely in the *disarticulation of its autobiographical value*, of its truthfulness, by means of a subversive use that makes conspicuous the non-authenticity of such ritual discursive practices, and perhaps, the very value of all biographies. Intimate discourse confidentially intended for a single person, but whose coming to the « attention of many » is not feared; furthermore, with hopes of being rewarded by being read and praised because « if it were not so, very few would write for one only » as « it is not done without trouble... ». In a word, ambiguity of the addressee, underlined by the ambiguity of the instituting subject. Even the name of Lázaro is, by itself, the condensation of a complete narrative program, not only because in the Gospels, it embodies the poverty of the beggar at the door of the wealthy Epulon, but also because of the artistic tradition that echoes this motif and that has its linguistic correlation in the words so frequently used in the *Lazarillo*: « lacerated », « lacerate », « laceration »*, all pertaining to the lexicon of misery. The selection of this name for the subject who institutes an autobiographical discourse is thus at the same time a negation of the discourse and the prefiguration of the character's fortune, given the expectations it creates in the reader. The *signifié* that Cros discovers in the folkloric anecdotes is very well connected with the name Lázaro as a correlative.

Nevertheless, the two correlatives are the reverse of the historic individuality and of the identity that autobiography requires between author and narrator, as it does between the grammatical subject and the speaking subject. For this reason, their function is none other than to unmask the farce: the « events so outstanding, and perchance, never heard nor seen » that are about to be narrated are short stories known in the folklore. The « I » that assumes them has declared himself non-authentic by the very fact of assuming them and by having an equally well known name — a kind of *mise en abyme* that creates and destroys at the same time the very artful device of the illusion of identity between author, narrator and personage which characterizes the *Lazarillo* in its anonymity. Perfect device and

* In Spanish: *lacerado*, *lacerar*, *laceria*. In Spanish, the meaning of these words extends to all manners of misery.

perfect strategy, in which the force that serves to convince, also serves to reveal as such, the devices and strategies. At the same time they create the illusion of movement, they reveal the puppet strings behind the farce — and the external hand (the implied author) that is manipulating them.

The truth here is thus, pure verisimilitude. [In case someone should be misled,] the « *contradictio in terminis* » confronted by the three elements of this discourse (subject – object – circumstances) will soon let the reader who will go deeper into the matter (those who « will not go as deep » will have to content themselves with the « amusement »), see that a ritual discourse, marked by the rules of its rhetoric convention, cannot be a true autobiography just as an authentic confession does not blend well with a juridical tribunal as hearer. The sophists well understood the function — already lamented by Plato — of rhetoric, and its means of persuasion, whose weight before the juridical courts is much more important than the very innocence of the accused. Indeed, to establish the truth in legal proceedings is pure chimera. It is, in reality, a question of the illusion of truth, of verisimilitude. It is this subversion we believe that the *Lazarillo* carries out by disrupting a ritual discursive practice and, with it, the ideology which is its foundation.

NOTES

- 1) At the VIII^e Congress of the Canadian Association of Hispanists (McGill University, June 1972), we put forward this working hypothesis in a communication whose summary was published in the *Boletín de Filología Española*, 42-45 (1972) 54-56. The Canadian Art Council subsequently gave us a grant that allowed us to consult various collections in archives and libraries, particularly the deeds of the Inquisition which are kept in the *Archivo Histórico Nacional* of Madrid.
- 2) Julia Kristeva, « Le mot, le dialogue et le roman », in *Semiotike, Recherches pour une sémanalyse* (Paris, 1969), pp. 143-173.
- 3) p. 29 in: *The pleasant histoire of Lazarillo de Tormes*. Drawn out of Spanish by David Rouland of Anglesey, 1586 (Repr.: Oxford, Blackwell 1924). From now on, we will quote from this edition, indicating between parenthesis the page of this text.
- 4) Montpellier, 1975, chapter IV, pp. 63-73.
- 5) *Rabelais and his World* (Moscow, 1965).

- 6) Francisco Rico *La novela picaresca y el punto de vista* (Barcelona, 1970), p. 127.
- 7) Edmond Cros, op. cit., pp. 65-66.
- 8) Mikhail Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevski's Poetic* (Moscow, 1953).
- 9) Michel Foucault, *L'ordre du discours* (Paris, 1971).
- 10) (Paris, 1966).
- 11) A. J. Greimas, *Sémantique structurale* (Paris, 1966), pp. 72-73.
- 12) J. Tynjanov, *Sobre la evolución literaria* (Leningrad, 1929), French translation in *Théorie de la littérature. Textes des formalistes russes réunis, présentés et traduits par Tzvetan Todorov* (Paris, 1965). See also Tzvetan Todorov, « L'héritage méthodologique du Formalisme », in *Poétique de la prose* (Paris, 1971), p. 9-31.
- 13) Julia Kristeva, *Le texte du roman. Approche sémiologique d'une structure discursive transformationnelle* (The Hague, 1970).
- 14) We are referring above all to Bielefeld's school in Germany and to the pragmatists in general.
- 15) V. Propp, *Morphologie du conte*, French translation (Paris, 1970), p. 31.
- 16) In *Picaresque européenne. Actes* (Montpellier, 1976), pp. 9-24.
- 17) Quoted by E. Cros, p. 21 from the edition of *Obras completas* of Vives (Madrid, 1947), I, p. 1395. Our translation.
- 18) E. Cros, op. cit., pp. 15-16.
- 19) On the problem of the composition or lack of it in the *Lazarillo* and on the different opinions on the subject, see Oldrich Belic « Los principios de composición en la novela picaresca » in *Análisis estructural de textos hispanos* (Madrid, 1969), pp. 19-60.
- 20) Prologue to the Biblioteca Básica Salvat's edition of the *Lazarillo de Tormes*, p. 13. Our translation.
- 21) Américo Castro, « Perspectiva de la novela picaresca », 1935, article incorporated in *Hacia Cervantes*, and prologue to Hesse and Williams' edition of the *Lazarillo* (1948), also incorporated in *Hacia Cervantes*: Claudio Guillén, « La disposición temporal del *Lazarillo de Tormes* » in *Hispanic Review*, XXV (1957), pp. 264-279; Fernando Lázaro Carreter, various articles incorporated in his book « *Lazarillo de Tormes* » en la picaresca (Barcelona, 1972).
- 22) Francisco Rico *Lazarillo de Tormes*, p. 13. Our translation.
- 23) Horst Baader, « Noch einmal zur Ich-Form im *Lazarillo de Tormes* » in *Romanische Forschungen*, 76 (1964), pp. 437-443.